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Abstract 
 
The main aim of this essay is to provide an approach to the analysis of the link between Thorstein Veblen’s 
evolutionary approach and  Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT). Analysing this connection we expect to shed 
some light on the potential contribution of Veblen’s theory of socio-economic evolution to the discussion on 
the application of EGT to social environments. We also attempt to investigate to what extent elements of EGT 
can be used to formalise some of the basic evolutionary principles proposed by Veblen. In order to study these 
issues, the paper has been structured as follows: in the first section, the methodological imperatives laid down 
by Veblen, defining an evolutionary approach, are presented. The main idea in this section is to provide an 
analytical framework that allows the evaluation of EGT in terms of Veblen’s evolutionary approach. To better 
understand the main principles and rationale behind EGT and how it can be applied as a tool for analysing 
issues on the diversity, interaction, and evolution of social systems, the second section presents a discussion 
of this non-traditional approach and its basic concepts. Finally, in the third section the main characteristics of 
EGT previously discussed are contrasted with Veblen’s principles outlined in the first part of the paper.  
 
JEL Classification: B15, B52, C72, D62,  
Keywords: Evolutionary Game Theory, Institutional and Evolutionary Economics and 
Thorstein B. Veblen. 
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1. Introduction 
 
One of the main criticisms of the “old” school of institutional economics is its lack of 
formality and of an operational approach that allows the replication of the institutional type 
of analysis by the academic economic community at large. Clearly this has been one of the 
reasons behind the seemingly little attention that this non-traditional approach to economics 
has received from a mainstream with an ever increasing emphasis on mathematical models 
(see Rutherford (1994)). Recently, however, some distinguished economists, recognising 
the importance of the institutional context in economic analysis, have started to incorporate 
topics usually associated with old institutionalism in the debate of the mainstream of 
economic thought. This has given rise to the development of what is now known as “new” 
institutional economics, typically associated with the names of Ronald Coase, Douglas 
North, Mancur Olson, Richard Posner, Oliver Williamson and others1. The main aim of this 
school has been to provide a formal approach to institutional analysis based mainly on neo-
classical and utilitarian foundations (see, for instance, Hodgson, 1993), thus leaving out of 
the study many of the basic principles behind the original tradition of institutional 
economics which push these foundations forward. Indeed, little has been done so far to 
formalise some of the main tenets and ideas of the “old” institutional-economics approach 
as proposed by their main exponents, namely Thorstein B. Veblen, John R. Commons and 
Wesley C. Mitchell. It is precisely in this context that this paper attempts to make a 
contribution. In particular, we attempt to link the work of Thorstein Veblen on evolutionary 
economics with the recently developed approach of biological game theory, or evolutionary 
game theory (EGT) as it is best known within economics. EGT is a formal, mathematical, 
approach within evolutionary economics, which thus far has been mainly applied to 
economics as a refinement of the Nash equilibrium concept. 
 
Considering that the main developments in EGT have occurred in the field of theoretical 
biology, it is not surprising that until now no clear link between EGT and any of the 
economic approaches identified with the label ‘evolutionary economics’ has been 
established. Indeed, EGT has so far been developed completely independently from 
evolutionary economics (Weibull, 1998: 2). Nevertheless, whenever a methodological link 
has been suggested, EGT has been principally connected with the work of economists like 
Joseph Schumpeter, David Hume, Karl Marx and Friedrich Hayek2. However, so far in the 
discussion one economist has been “conspicuous” by his absence, Thorstein Veblen. To the 
knowledge of the authors, no specific work analyses Veblen’s contribution to the 
development of a theory of socio-economic evolution in relation to the potential application 
of EGT to the social context. This is quite extraordinary considering the rather Darwinian 
nature of EGT, and the fact that Veblen was one the first economists to make a direct 
appeal to biological science for inspiration and certainly the first economist to propose 
explicitly an approach to economics based on Darwinian lines, or as he put it a ‘post-
                                                
1 For reviews of the new institutional-economics paradigm, see inter alia: Andersen and Bregn (1992), 
Hodgson (1989; 1993; 1998) and Rutherford (1989; 1994). 
2 See, for instance, Sugden (1986; 1989), Hargreaves Heap and Varoufakis (1995) and Vromen (1994) 
respectively. 
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Darwinian’ economics. This is even more striking considering that some authors have 
argued that Veblen was relatively successful in establishing the basis of a Darwinian 
economics (Hodgson, 1992; 1993; 1999). 
 
Analysing the connection between Veblen’s evolutionary approach and that of EGT we 
expect to shed some light on the potential contribution of Veblen’s theory of socio-
economic evolution to the discussion of the application of EGT to social environments. 
Similarly, we also investigate to what extent elements of EGT can be used to formalise 
some of the basic evolutionary principles proposed by Veblen. The paper has been 
structured as follows. The first section presents the methodological imperatives laid down 
by Veblen, defining an evolutionary approach. In particular, we outline here the main 
characteristics of an evolutionary science as understood by Veblen, and the reasons of why 
he thought that the economics of his time was not one. In addition, some key characteristics 
of a Veblenian evolutionary-economics approach are put forward. The main idea in this 
section is to provide an analytical framework that allows the evaluation of EGT in terms of 
Veblen’s evolutionary approach. To better understand the main principles and rationale 
behind EGT and how it can be applied as a tool for analysing issues on the diversity, 
interaction, and evolution of social systems (as opposed to biological evolution for which 
EGT was originally developed), the second section presents a discussion of this non-
traditional approach and its basic concepts. In particular, we present and discuss the 
concepts of Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS) and Replicator Dynamics (RD), providing 
some simple economic examples. In the third section, we contrast the main characteristics 
of EGT with Veblen’s principles outlined in the first part of the paper. In particular, we 
examine EGT on two accounts: is EGT consistent with Veblen’s notion of an evolutionary 
science? and can Veblen’s main evolutionary tenets be useful in the discussion on EGT? 
and vice versa. Finally, some concluding remarks are offered. 
 
2. Veblen’s Evolutionary Economics 
 
The analysis of Veblen’s evolutionary economics is centred here principally on 
methodological work presented in his seminal 1898 article in the Quarterly Journal of 
Economics (QJE) on “Why is economics not an evolutionary science?”. Although, much of 
Veblen’s theoretical work on evolutionary economics was developed later in his first three 
books, “The Theory of the Leisure Class” (1899), “The Theory of Business Enterprise” 
(1904), and “The Instinct of Workmanship” (1914), it was in this essay where he 
formulated the methodological basis that guided his research work over the subsequent 25 
years (Rutherford, 1998: 464).  
 
The work presented by Veblen in this article was essentially a manifesto for an 
evolutionary economics, a methodological outline, which according to some authors can be 
considered not only as one of the key founding works of institutional and evolutionary 
economics, but also as the beginning of a major paradigm shift in economic thought 
(Hodgson, 1998: 398; Wisman, 1989: 1). Indeed Veblen, after recognising that economics 
“stands in need of rehabilitation” (Veblen, 1898: 373), attempted to show the way forward 
in the field by proposing an alternative methodological perspective. In Veblen’s opinion 
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economics was not a “modern science” because it was not evolutionary, and proposed 
instead what he called a “post-Darwinian” economic science (Veblen, 1898: 374-75). 
Veblen accordingly claimed that economics should adopt the metaphor of evolution-and-
change, rather than the static ideas of equilibrium that had been borrowed by neo-classical 
economists from physics (Hodgson, 1992: 286).  
 
While reviewing Veblen's work regarding evolution in all its extension is far beyond the 
scope of this paper, we address here two main points. First, what were the main 
characteristics according to Veblen of an evolutionary science, and why he thought that 
economics of his time was not one. And second, Veblen's main proposals in terms of what 
he thought an evolutionary-economics approach should be all about.3  
 
2.1 Veblen’s Conception of Evolution: A Taxonomic versus an Evolutionary Science. 
 
For Veblen while economics could be considered close to an evolutionary science in some 
respects, the underlying principles behind the analysis and the formulation and 
interpretation of the facts were somehow different to that of scientists embracing an 
evolutionary science. In particular, Veblen claimed that the evolutionist, or "the modern 
scientist” as he called it, would be unwilling to depart from the “test of causal relation or 
quantitative sequence” when analysing the problem at hand. According to him evolutionists 
would insist on an answer in terms of cause and effect, being this type of analysis their last 
recourse. At this point he suggested that this last recourse had been made available in his 
time “for the handling of schemes of development and theories of a comprehensive process 
by the notion of a cumulative causation.” (Veblen, 1898: 377-378). Here Veblen went one 
step further and pointed out that this notion of cumulative causation implied that in order to 
explain any economic process the analysis should be carried out only in terms of cause and 
effect, and that therefore economists should leave out of the analysis any search for “higher 
grounds for their ultimate syntheses”. 
 
The kind of analysis proposed by Veblen, based mainly in terms of cause and effect omitted 
any consideration or assumption about the normal state of things or about the tendencies of 
events to develop in a particular way towards a predetermined end. In consequence, the 
scientist should not have a predetermined view about where the system goes or where it 
should go. Scientific inquiry, therefore, should be based on an analysis of the facts alone 
and the potential relationships between these facts and past situations which could cause or 
affect them. From this type of analysis it is clear that according to Veblen, history should 
matter in economics, and that the future is open and uncertain. Indeed, it can be argued that 
Veblen’s discussion on cumulative causation involves a clear idea of path dependency4.  
 
The idea of the concept of cumulative causation is also a clear indication of Veblen’s 
commitment to a Darwinian conception of economics. Indeed, Darwin’s conception of 
                                                
3 For a complete analysis of these two issues see Villena and Villena (2002). This paper is available upon 
request. 
4 On this issue, see, for instance, Rutherford (1994: 11) and Pluta and Leathers (1978: 133). 
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evolution was materialist, and he explicitly recognised that evolution is not guided by a 
“law of necessary development” (Edgell and Tilman, 1989: 1005). Hence, it is clear that 
Veblen’s concept of cumulative causation follows Darwin’s theory of evolution in the sense 
that it is free of any preconception regarding inherent tendencies or controlling principles 
which underlie the laws of motion. From this standpoint, dynamic analysis in a truly 
evolutionary, Darwinian, theory is characterised by “non-spiritual” sequences and 
“dispassionate cumulative causation” (Argyrous and Sethi, 1996: 476).  
 
For Veblen this was the main difference between economics and evolutionary sciences, 
while for evolutionists the system is unbound to follow any particular direction, for 
economists in general the system tends to move towards an equilibrium point. In this way, 
economists typically think that the economic system behaves according to a specific 
pattern, some sort of “natural law”, which makes the system evolve towards a point which 
is the normal state of affairs. In this framework any event or situation that makes the system 
move away from this state should be considered as a “disturbing factor”, something 
external to the system. Veblen called this perspective, which he associated with the 
classical economists, the “standpoint of ceremonial adequacy”.  
 
According to Veblen, following this “standpoint of ceremonial adequacy”, economists 
working within this framework analyse any economic problem considering the conditions 
under which this “putative” equilibrium supervenes. Paraphrasing Veblen, these conditions 
are reduced to a normalised scheme of relations which “spiritually” bind on the behaviour 
of the problem studied. Using this normalised scheme as a guide, the economist can then 
develop a “ceremonially consistent formula” applying the deductive method. Finally, the 
formula can be tested by comparison with observed permutations, using the "normal case"; 
the results arrived at are thus authenticated by induction. The events that do not conform to 
the relation stated by the formula are considered abnormal cases produced by disturbing 
causes (Veblen, 1898: 383-384). 
 
Hence Veblen claimed that: “In all this the agencies or forces causally at work in the 
economic life process are neatly avoided. The outcome of the method, at its best, is a body 
of logically consistent propositions concerning the normal relations of things -- a system of 
economic taxonomy. At its worst, it is a body of maxims for the conduct of business and a 
polemical discussion of disputed points of policy.” (Veblen, 1898: 384; Emphasis added). 
This “system of economic taxonomy” can therefore be seen as the result of an economic 
science formulated in terms of teleology. It is noteworthy that a taxonomic science does not 
imply the presence of teleology, but the presence of teleology implies that a science is 
taxonomic (Wesson, 1999: 3-4). In this respect, and following Veblen’s work Joseph P. 
Wesson points out that on these terms reality can be described without assuming that it is 
purposeful. By contrast if reality is assumed to be purposeful outside of subjective human 
desires, then all that is left for the scientist to do is to describe the process by which the 
purpose is played out. For if reality is purposeful in the teleological sense, then there is no 
room for explanation, the teleology is the explanation (Wesson, 1999: 3-4). 
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In summary, according to Veblen’s analysis the main difference between economics and 
evolutionary sciences can be expressed in terms of a teleological versus an evolutionary 
mode of scientific thought, which in turn implies a theory drawn in causal terms rather than 
in terms of teleology. In others words, Veblen rejected the notion of equilibrium and 
advocated an evolutionary science where the evolution of events is unbounded, and where 
the system, can therefore end up in a state which is not necessarily good or bad in terms of 
society’s welfare. In these terms, the behaviour of the system does not respond to any 
“natural law”, and therefore it can not be successfully studied in those terms. Figure 1 
below summarises our brief review of Veblen’s distinction between an economic and an 
evolutionary science. 
 
 
 
From Figure 1, we can mention the following characteristics that Veblen associated with an 
economic evolutionary science: 
 
i. A Darwinian conception of economics 
ii. The idea that history matters in economic analysis, and 
iii. The irrelevance of the notion of equilibrium. 
 
2.2 Some Key Characteristics of Veblen’s Evolutionary Economics 
 
In addition to Veblen’s conception of an evolutionary science, discussed above, we can also 
point out some key characteristics present in Veblen’s evolutionary approach. 
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i. Institutions as the Basic Unit of Analysis: Economists should study “the dynamic 
side of the economic process” namely the human factor through its “prevalent habits 
of thought”5. In other words, economics should consider in its analysis the idea of 
social institutions which involves not only economic factors in the analysis but also 
social and cultural factors which can importantly influence the individual’s 
behaviour.  
ii. Institutional Context: Consequently, economists should not be only concerned with 
the “economic sphere” narrowly defined, but with all the spheres that compose the 
cultural environment of the agent. This implies that institutional factors should be 
also considered in the analysis. 
iii. Not Optimising Behaviour: An evolutionary economics should also allow for the 
study of not optimising behaviour from the part of the individual, since this type of 
analysis necessarily points to the characterisation of static equilibria. 
iv. Institutional Inertia and Conflict: The durable character of social institutions 
implies that there can be some conflict between newly adopted institutions and 
previously adopted ones, and that certain social institutions can also produce 
socially inefficient outcomes.  
v. Evolution of Institutions: More importantly, in this context, given the durable 
character of social institutions, they can be considered as an equivalent to the gene 
in the socio-economic world. 
 
Having briefly reviewed Veblen’s work on evolutionary economics and spelt out some of 
its most important principles, let us turn to the analysis of the Evolutionary Game Theoretic 
Approach. 
 
3. The Evolutionary Game Theoretic Approach 
 
In the past few years, and mostly since the publication of biologist John Maynard Smith’s 
book on “Evolution and the Theory of Games”, evolutionary game theory (EGT) has 
started to attract the attention of many economists who question the idea of perfect rational 
agents as the only valid assumption in the study of human economic behaviour. Since John 
F. Nash's seminal work on Non-Co-operative Games was published in 1951, many 
refinements to his equilibrium concept have been proposed. These attempts, which aim at 
capturing the behaviour of perfectly rational players as opposed to providing a widely 
accepted notion of rationality in economics, have given rise to many criticisms. These 
criticisms question the very existence of a single notion of “perfect rationality” and point to 
the idea that the study of perfect rationality alone would not lead to an understanding of 
human behaviour (Matsui, 1996: 263). Hence, EGT as an approach that does not 
necessarily require agents to be “rational” – introducing the more modest assumption that 
people adjust their behaviour on a trial and error basis towards the action which yields the 
highest pay-off – has attracted the attention of many economists and game theorists who, in 
                                                
5 The “habits of thought” concept is recurrent in Veblen’s work and gave rise to his concept of “institution”. 
For an analysis of the concept of “institution” in the context of the “old” school of institutional economics see, 
inter alia, Hodgson (1988: 117-140), and Neale (1994: 402-406). 
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turn, have started to direct their attention away from their elaborate definitions of rationality 
(Binmore, 1996: x). Since then, new EGT models have been developed by economists and 
many of the results from the biology literature have been adapted and generalised to the 
context of social evolution. At present, EGT forms part of the economics literature with a 
large number of journal articles and some monographs and textbooks . 
 
The EGT approach can be explained in simple terms by comparing it with non-co-operative 
game theory. According to George J. Mailath, non-co-operative game theory is built on two 
basic assumptions: “Maximisation, every economic agent is a rational decision maker with 
a clear understanding of the world; and consistency, the agent's understanding – 
expectations in particular – of other agent's behaviour is correct, (i.e. the overall pattern of 
individual optimising behaviour forms a Nash equilibrium)” (Mailath, 1998: 1347). 
Consequently, non-co-operative game theory typically assumes that in each position of the 
game a rational agent plays the game against another rational player exactly once. On the 
other hand, EGT does not assume common knowledge rationality; in fact players are 
boundedly rational, having little or no information about the game. The game in question is 
being played not once but many times by agents who are randomly drawn from large 
populations (Weibull, 1998: 1). In other words, EGT does not necessarily require agents to 
be “rational”, placing more importance on what has been established in a society. Although 
EGT is still at the stage of theoretical development, without many applications to economic 
contexts, some researchers have already noticed its potential usefulness for the study of 
several economic problems because of  its key characteristics (Matsui, 1996: 263).   
 
3.1 Evolutionary Stability Criteria 
 
Evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) is one of the central concepts in evolutionary game 
theory (Maynard Smith and Price, 1973; Maynard Smith, 1974, 1982). In general, a 
strategy (phenotype) that is evolutionarily stable is said to be robust to evolutionary-
selection pressures in an exact sense. The typical framework in which this concept is 
applied is one where individuals are repeatedly drawn at random from a large population to 
play a symmetric two-person game. At first, all individuals are genetically or otherwise 
"programmed" to play a particular pure or mixed strategy of the game. Then, at some point, 
it is assumed that a small proportion of the population adopts a different pure or mixed 
strategy and that those individuals are also programmed to play only that strategy. In this 
context, the incumbent strategy is said to be evolutionarily stable if there exists a positive 
invasion barrier, in terms of population size, that makes each such mutant strategy not 
perform as well as the incumbent strategy in terms of payoffs. In other words, if a mutant 
strategy is played by a proportion of the population which falls below the invasion barrier, 
then the incumbent strategy earns a higher payoff than the mutant strategy, and therefore 
cannot be invaded by it (Weibull, 1996: 33-34). As Vega-Redondo (1996: 13-14) put it :"A 
strategy is said to be an ESS if, once adopted by the whole population, no mutation adopted 
by an arbitrarily small fraction of individuals can 'invade' (i.e. enter and survive) by 
obtaining at least a comparable payoff." An ESS is thus intended to reflect a stationary 
situation in the evolutionary process in which the pattern of behaviour prevailing in the 
species cannot be invaded by any mutation which is a better fit. 
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While the criterion of evolutionary stability is based on ideas from biology, it can be argued 
that it also provides a relevant robustness criterion for human behaviours in a broad variety 
of situations including many interactions in economic contexts. In such a context, 
evolutionary stability may be thought of as a norm or institution (Weibull, 1996: 33-34). In 
general, the EGT approach presents some clear differences when applied to economics. As 
typically presented in biology the ESS concept is associated with the notion that higher 
success reflects an advantage in reproducing; this being comparable to monetary payoffs in 
the socio-economic context. Thus, the social mechanisms of learning and imitation in EGT 
are more important than the genetic mechanism when applied to the socio-economic 
context, implying that emulation of successful behavioural attitudes (phenotypes) leads to 
evolutionary selection. Individual traits that produce lower payoffs will thus be driven out 
by more successful traits. Consequently, imitation may induce a process that resembles 
natural selection or the ‘survival of the fittest’6 (Bester and Güth, 1998: 201). 
3.1.1 Conditions for Evolutionary Stability7. 
 
Consider a large population of players. In each period, agents are randomly matched to play 
a symmetric (and finite) 2x2-person game. Suppose that initially all members play a certain 
pure or mixed strategy  from a set S.  Now allow a small population share of individuals 
to enter who all play some other pure or mixed strategy s (∈ S). We say that the 
monomorphic population in which all individuals play  is stable, i.e. resistant against 
mutations, if each mutant s that enters the population with small frequency is selected 
against. In other words, playing strategy s always yields a lower payoff than strategy . To 
state this formally, let us assume that whenever an individual playing strategy  meets 
another adopting strategy s, the payoff (number of offspring) to  is π( , s), where 
 is a given fitness function. Thus, we can define an ESS as follows. 
 
Definition 1: A strategy  is said to be an evolutionarily stable strategy  (ESS) if these 
conditions hold. (Maynard Smith and Price, 1973; Maynard Smith, 1982).  
 
(2)  
(3)  
 
Condition (2) is the basic equilibrium requirement, which ensures that  is at least as good 
a reply to itself as any other strategy. Condition (3) guarantees that can not be invaded by 
any mutant strategy. We can see this by assuming that (2) holds as an equality. If this 
occurs a population playing  might be invaded by an agent adopting strategy s,  since an 
s-player would do no worse than the -players in this setting. Consequently, in order to 
                                                
6 See, for instance, Mailath (1992) and Selten (1991) for a discussion. Björnerstedt and Weibull (1996) show 
that population dynamics based in imitation may be closely related to biological dynamics. 
7 See Van Damme ( 1994: 848-849) and Weibull (1998: 4-45). 
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avoid a successful invasion of s-players, we have two options: either  must be strictly 
better than s when playing against or, whenever this does not hold, must be better 
when playing an s than s is when playing itself (Hargreaves Heap and Varoufakis, 1995: 
198). In other words, condition (2) shows that ( , ) is a Nash equilibrium if  is an ESS 
and because of (3) not every symmetric Nash equilibrium corresponds to an ESS. In fact, 
every ESS induces a proper – hence perfect – equilibrium (Van Damme, 1987). 
 
To better understand the concept of evolutionary stability let us conclude this section with a 
simple numerical example. 
 
Example 1. 
 
Let us consider a doubly symmetric 2-player game with two pure strategies and payoff 
matrix: 
 
(4)  
 
 
Since C-C > NC-C and NC-NC > C-NC, we have that this game is a co-ordination game. 
We can think of this game for example as a two-person common property resource game in 
which, the common resource is an inshore fishery exploited by two fishermen, and that 
each agent can exploit the fishery choosing between two different levels of effort, e.g., 
fishing effort might be measured by the number of standardised vessels operating in a 
fishery during a particular day. In particular, here we consider a low fishing effort, C, 
which we call co-operative, and a high fishing effort, NC, which we call non-co-operative. 
From the payoff matrix it can be inferred that if both players choose the co-operative 
fishing effort, they will be better off than if both players use the non-co-operative fishing 
effort, i.e. a payoff of 6 against one of 3. This could be the case if both players adopt the 
large fishing effort, the stock could be harvested to a level where extraction gets more 
difficult and therefore not as profitable as in that case where both fishermen use the low 
fishing effort giving thus more time to the stock to recover. Playing in a co-operative 
manner is not without its risks, since if one plays co-operatively and the other non-co-
operatively the player can end up receiving nothing while his/her opponent gets a payoff of 
4. In terms of our example this makes sense, since, as we have assumed here, co-operation 
means using a lower effort to exploit the resource, which, depending on the relation 
between efforts, can imply that the other individual using a larger effort can be able to 
harvest the stock down to a level where it is not more profitable for individual 1 to continue 
in business or even can harvest the entire stock and there will then be nothing left for 
individual 1. In any case the co-operative individual will lose revenue by using a lower 
effort than the other individual who uses a larger effort. Finally, if considering the risk of 
playing co-operative both players decide to use the non-co-operative fishing effort then 
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they get a return of 3, which is lower than that obtained if both players decide to play co-
operative, getting a return of 6.  
 
Consequently, according to the basic principles of traditional game theory, it is evident that 
here both players (strictly) prefer the strategy profile C-C, which gives payoff 6 to each 
player. Indeed, C-C is a strict Nash equilibrium. However, the pure strategy profile NC-NC 
is also a strict Nash equilibrium, resulting in payoff 3 to each player. If one player expects 
the other to play strategy NC with sufficiently high probability, then her unique optimal 
action is to play strategy NC as well. The game has a third Nash equilibrium, which is 
mixed. This corresponds to the symmetric pair  where , the payoff to each 
player in this equilibrium being . All Nash equilibria are clearly perfect: Two are strict, 
and one is interior. 
 
It can be shown that each of the two pure strategies in this co-ordination game is an ESS, 
since each of these is the unique best reply to itself. Let us first consider that playing 
strategy C is the norm in the population, i.e. there is a co-operative institution in place, and 
that NC corresponds to a mutant strategy, i.e. in terms of equations (2) and (3),  and 
. In this context, first, we have to check whether or not the inequality given in (2) is 
satisfied. In this case from (4) the first condition of stability, i.e.  is 
clearly satisfied since: 4 ≤ 6. The second condition is also satisfied since 
. Consequently, to play the co-operative strategy C is an ESS in the 
population. Similarly, for the case where strategy NC is the norm in the population, i.e. 
there is a non-co-operative institution in place, and C corresponds to a mutant strategy, 
i.e.  and , we have that the first and second conditions of stability are 
satisfied since: 0 ≤ 3, i.e. . Therefore, playing non-co-operative 
strategy NC is also an ESS. It can also be easily checked that the mixed strategy , is 
not an ESS.■  
 
3.2 Evolutionary Dynamics 
 
The criterion of evolutionary stability emphasises the role of mutations in an evolutionary 
process – a mutation mechanism. However, a selection mechanism is also required that 
favours some varieties over others.  This is precisely the role of replicator dynamics, which 
does not embrace any mutation mechanism at all. Robustness against mutations is 
indirectly taken care of by dynamic stability criteria (Weibull, 1996: 69).  
 
Despite being a static concept, ESS does relate to some basic dynamic process. In fact, a 
strategy profile must be an asymptotically stable point of a simple dynamic in a 
monomorphic population in order to be an ESS. Nevertheless, a dynamic process based on 
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a monomorphic population clearly fails to capture the real dynamic process in its whole 
dimension. This is due to the assumption that each agent in a monomorphic population 
adopts a common strategy that may be pure or mixed, whereas in the real world a 
population   typically consists of a variety of agents, each taking a pure strategy (Matsui, 
1996: 270-271). Consequently, the replicator permits the analysis of a genuinely diverse 
range of behaviour (that is, a polymorphic profile of strategies (Vega-Redondo, 1996:43-
44)) as opposed to the concept of ESS, which makes good theoretical sense only when it 
represents a monomorphic situation. 
 
As typically formalised in the literature, the replicator is formally presented here as an 
ordinary differential equation.  
3.2.1 The Replicator Equation8 
 
Let us consider a game with n pure strategies. If an agent playing strategy i meets an agent 
adopting strategy j, the payoff to i is . Assuming that  is the probability of 
meeting each type in the population, the expected payoff to an i-player is then 
. Hence, the average payoff in the game becomes  
(Gintis, 2000: 201). In this setting the replicator dynamics can be defined as follows. 
 
Definition 2: The dynamic in a polymorphic population is called the replicator dynamic 
and is given by: 
 
(5) , 
 
where  denotes the average fitness of the population. Equation (5) is called the 
replicator equation. 
 
From equation (5) it transpires that according to the replicator equation, the strategies that 
grow are those that perform better than average, and that generally the best performing 
strategies grow the fastest. In this framework, a Nash equilibrium is a stationary point of 
the dynamic system. On the other hand, each stable stationary point is a Nash equilibrium 
and an asymptotically stable fixed point is a perfect equilibrium (Bomze, 1986). Moreover, 
evolutionary stability becomes a sufficient (but not necessary) condition for asymptotic 
stability if only pure strategies can be inherited (Taylor and Jonker, 1978).  
 
                                                
8 The mathematical formulation of the replicator dynamics is due to Taylor and Jonker (1978). 
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Example 2. 
 
Let us obtain the replicator dynamics for the same doubly symmetric 2-player game with 
two pure strategies and payoff matrix given by (4) of example 1. Here we suppose that 
within the population there is a proportion of players using the co-operative strategy C, and 
other of players adopting the non-co-operative strategy NC which we denote and  
respectively. We also have the identity . Thus, we get the following replicator 
equation: 
 
(6) . 
 
In order to see how solutions of (6) change over time, let us draw the associated phase 
portrait. Defining , we have that the steady states or stationary solutions of the 
differential equation (6), i.e. the zeros of , are: ,  and . The 
derivative of  is as follows: 
 
(7) . 
 
Evaluating  at the rest points, we have that: (i) if  then , (ii) if 
 then , and (iii) if  then . Accordingly, since , 
we have the following: (i) if  then  is negative; (ii) if  then  is 
positive; (iii) if  then  is negative; and (iv) if  then  is 
positive. With this information we can draw the phase portrait of (6), see figure 2 below. 
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From figure 2, it is clear that  the steady states , and  are asymptotically 
stable, while  is unstable. In other words, if one starts to the left of 3/5, that is where 
the population playing C, co-operative, is a rather small proportion of the total population, 
the system tends to the steady state , i.e. the co-operative population is wiped out. If 
one starts anywhere to the right of 3/5, the system tends to the steady state , i.e. the 
population adopting the non-co-operative strategy is wiped out. The unstable equilibrium at 
 is the boundary, or separatrix, between the region of attraction of  and that 
of .■ 
 
4. Is Evolutionary Game Theory Veblenian? 
 
Having presented the main concepts and rationale behind evolutionary game theory, in this 
section we attempt to evaluate this approach in terms of Veblen’s evolutionary framework. 
Basically we will examine EGT on two accounts. First, is EGT consistent with Veblen’s 
notion of an evolutionary science? And second, can Veblen’s main evolutionary tenets be 
useful in the discussion on EGT? and vice versa. 
 
4.1 Veblen’s Notion of An Evolutionary Science and Evolutionary Game Theory 
4.1.1 A Darwinian Approach to Economics 
 
From the review on Veblen’s evolutionary tenets and the brief description of  evolutionary 
game theory’s main features and concepts, a first point of comparison that can be made 
between these approaches is the Darwinian character of both of them. Indeed, as argued 
above, Veblen explicitly attempted to develop his economic approach based on Darwin’s 
theory of evolution, what he called a “post-Darwinian” economics science (Veblen, 1898: 
374-75). Veblen’s commitment towards an evolutionary, Darwinian, science is reflected in 
his emphasis on a non-teleological type of analysis based on cumulative causation, i.e. an 
analysis in terms of cause effect. In the same way, EGT is also based on evolutionary ideas 
taken from biology. In fact the two basic concepts in EGT, namely evolutionary stability 
and replicator dynamics, attempt to highlight the role of mutations, and the role of selection 
respectively, which represent the basis of any biological evolutionary process (Weibull, 
1995: 69). In this context, the Darwinian nature of EGT is evident since the concept of 
evolutionary stability can be said to generalise “Darwin's notion of survival of the fittest 
from an exogenous environment to a strategic environment where the fitness of a given 
behavior (strategy) depends on the behaviors (strategies) of others"(Weibull, 1996: 33-34) 
and the concept of the replicator dynamics can be interpreted as “a stylised formalisation of 
Darwinian natural selection which follows directly from an identification of pay-off and 
‘fitness’, i.e. reproductive success” (Vega-Redondo, 1996: 4). Consequently, the Darwinian 
character of these two approaches provides solid grounds to link Veblen’s methodological 
proposals with EGT, which main developments have thus far occurred not in economics but 
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in the field of theoretical biology. Indeed, in this respect Veblen’s work seems closer than 
other methodological schools within evolutionary economics to provide EGT with the 
necessary economic rationale to apply EGT’s tools to the socio-economic context. 9  
4.1.2 The Importance of History in Economic Analysis 
 
From our review on Veblen’s evolutionary principles we also saw that the concept of 
cumulative causation put forward by Veblen implies that history is significant in economics 
analysis (see figure 1). In the Veblenian framework, the emphasis on an analysis based on 
terms of cause and effect points toward the notion that the current state of affairs must be 
necessarily analysed considering related events occurred during the past, which somehow 
determine the present situation. In particular, within this framework initial conditions are 
crucial in this scheme and even small differences may imply widely differing outcomes. 
This obviously points toward the openness of the evolution of the socio-economic system.  
 
We can argue that this idea on the importance of history in economic analysis is in a sense 
consistent with the evolutionary game theoretic approach to the social context. Indeed, the 
basic concepts of evolutionary game theory, namely evolutionary stability and replicator 
dynamics, which as we saw in section three relate to the evolution of groups within 
populations, pay special attention to the relationship between past and current events. We 
can see this in the context of the replicator dynamics by reviewing the exercise presented in 
example 2. In that example we used the concept of the replicator dynamics to analyse the 
evolution of a population where there is a proportion of players using the co-operative 
strategy C, and other of players adopting the non-co-operative strategy NC. We can 
interpret these two strategies as two different institutions (or conventions or norms), one co-
operative and the other non-co-operative. The result given in example 2 clearly shows that 
in this particular example the emergence of one institution as the dominant one depends on 
the initial number of people who subscribe to each institution. In particular, if, initially, less 
than 60% of the total population adheres to the co-operative institution, then the non-co-
operative one will become the dominant in the long run and people adopting the co-
operative strategy will be wiped out. Otherwise, the co-operative institution will become 
the dominant and the population adopting the non-co-operative strategy will be wiped out. 
This clearly points to the importance of initial conditions which somehow determine future 
developments and to the relevance of studying the historical context in evolutionary game 
theory. While at present this is not common practice in EGT, some economists, like Ken 
Binmore, have already started to recognise this important issue in the literature on game 
theory (see Binmore, 1996: x-xi).  
 
A related point here is that, as recognised by Rutherford (1994: 11), in the Veblenian 
framework there is place for formal theory, as that that could be provided by evolutionary 
                                                
9 For example EGT has been connected with the works of Joseph Schumpeter, David Hume, Karl Marx and 
Friedrich Hayek (see, for instance, Weibull (1998), Sugden (1986; 1989), Hargreaves Heap and Varoufakis 
(1995) and Vromen (1994) respectively). Nevertheless, Veblen’s evolutionary economics seems to be the 
only one consistent with the Darwinian nature of EGT (for details see Villena and Villena (2002)). 
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game theory, but that the analysis of the historical context should not be limited to highly 
abstract formal models. This idea implies that while EGT can be useful to formalise 
Veblen’s notion of cumulative causation and thus the importance of history in economic 
analysis, this formalistic type of analysis should also be complemented by a more 
descriptive review of the historical context which allows us to fully capture the historical 
details of the specific situation in analysis. In terms of example 2, we could study, for 
instance, the historical facts behind a large initial population adhering to the co-operative 
institution. An analysis of this type would be clearly specific to the case study being 
examined, involving  a study of the historical accidents which could have initiated the 
"cumulative effect" leading to the population composition of the present. 
4.1.3 Irrelevance of the Notion of Equilibrium 
 
As we saw in section 2.1, key to Veblen’s approach is the idea that the notion of 
equilibrium is meaningless within an evolutionary framework. This basically means that we 
can not discard any possible outcome as the result of evolution, and that therefore we may 
in some cases arrive to a stationary state in the long run, but in others we may not. If one 
analyses the two basic concepts of EGT as presented in this paper we can conclude that the 
concept of evolutionary stability as well as the replicator dynamics do somehow support 
this basic idea about the openness of evolution. Indeed, while both of these concepts can in 
some cases provide support to the notion of Nash equilibrium and the assumptions of 
rationality of traditional game theory, it is also true that in some cases both concepts are 
undetermined. In other words there are many situations where the result of evolution as 
represented by these concepts does not end up in a stationary state.  
 
In particular, in terms of the concept of evolutionary stability, we have that by condition (2) 
every ESS is a Nash equilibrium and because of (3) not every symmetric Nash equilibrium 
corresponds to an ESS. In addition, many games have no evolutionarily stable strategies at 
all. For example, if we go beyond the basic model which only deals with two-person, 
symmetric, static interactions, and consider an asymmetric context with different 
populations where players can take different roles (such as buyers and sellers), the 
existence of ESSs is not ensured. Indeed, as showed by Selten (1980), in the asymmetric 
case, the conditions analogous to (2) and (3) can be satisfied only at a strict Nash 
equilibrium (if there would be an alternative best reply to the equilibrium, a mutant playing 
this best reply could invade since it would never meet itself). Many games do not admit 
such equilibria, hence, they fail to have ESS (Van Damme, 1994: 851). Non-existence is 
even more common in extensive form games due to in this context an ESS has to reach all 
information sets in order to exclude alternative best responses (Selten, 1983). The non-
existence of the static concept of equilibrium, ESS, in some contexts gives some room for 
linking Veblen’s idea about the openness of evolution with evolutionary game theory. 
Indeed, if sometimes there exist an equilibrium point and sometimes does not, then 
evolutionary modelling within this framework can not be based on the notion of 
equilibrium. Nevertheless, instead of following Veblen’s views on the irrelevance 
equilibrium in an evolutionary approach, game theorists have started to look to alternative 
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equilibrium concepts in evolutionary game theory. As Eric Van Damme put it: “[t]heorists 
have been reluctant to give up the idea of equilibrium and they have come up with concepts 
with somewhat better existence properties” (Van Damme, 1994: 851). Among these 
attempts we can mention some weakening and set-valued versions of evolutionary stability 
proposed by Maynard Smith (1982), Thomas (1985) and Swinkels (1992). 
 
Similarly, the concept of the replicator dynamics as defined here in its basic formulation 
(see Taylor and Jonker (1978)) is not without its problems when talking about the idea of 
equilibrium, as understood in conventional game theory. Indeed, sometimes the solution 
trajectory of the replicator dynamics does not converge, implying that in some cases there 
is no possible equilibrium in an evolutionary dynamical game. This, in turn, relates to the 
notion of rationality in evolutionary game theory. As Jörgen W. Weibull explains: “If an 
interior solution to a weakly payoff-positive selection dynamics converges over time, then 
we have seen that the surviving strategies are rational in the sense of being best replies to 
the resulting mixed-strategy profile. The question hence is what happens if the solution 
trajectory does not converge. When there is no hope of equilibrium play in the long run we 
are lead to the question whether play is rational” (Weibull, 1998: 11). 
 
A basic rationality postulate in non-co-operative game theory is that players never use pure 
strategies that are strictly dominated. This postulate requires no knowledge of other players 
preferences or behaviour (Weibull, 1998: 11). Nevertheless, the population share of 
individuals programmed to a certain pure strategy grows in the replicator dynamics (5) if 
and only if the strategy earns a payoff above the current population average, and since even 
a strictly dominated strategy may earn more than average, it is not clear a priori whether 
such strategies necessarily get wiped out in the replicator dynamics. This is confirmed by 
Dekel and Scotchmer (1992) who provide a game in which a strategy for this reason does 
not become extinct in a discrete-time version of the replicator dynamics (Weibull, 1996: 
79). Consequently, the concept of the replicator dynamics does not provide a total support 
neither for the notion of equilibrium nor the rationality postulate. 
 
Nevertheless, despite all these problems to justify the use of Nash equilibrium and the 
notion of rationality using elements of EGT, game theorists still seem reluctant to discuss 
whether or not the idea of equilibrium is really needed or even compatible with an 
evolutionary economic approach. In this context, it becomes clear the potential contribution 
of Veblen’s insights on the subject to this discussion. This obviously remains a topic for 
further research. 
 
4.2 Veblen’s Evolutionary Approach to Economics and Evolutionary Game Theory 
4.2.1 Institutions as the Basic Unit of Analysis 
 
A vital point in Veblen’s approach is his focus on the dynamic side of the economic 
process, what he called “prevalent habits of thought” and gave rise to his concept of 
institutions. In particular, Veblen argued that institutions should be the basic unit of 
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analysis in economics science. This point is also relevant when comparing Veblen’s 
approach with EGT. Indeed, as briefly discussed above, it can be noted that when the 
concepts of evolutionary stability and replicator dynamics, which have thus far been mainly 
applied in biology to analyse animal behaviour, are applied to the socio-economic context 
they are typically used to study the development of institutions (or conventions or norms as 
they are sometimes called in the modern economic literature) in society10.  
 
This emphasis on an institutional type of analysis provides another key link between 
Veblen’s evolutionary economics and EGT. While Veblen’s institutional approach is 
frequently associated with a descriptive type of institutional analysis, the EGT approach to 
social institutions is more formal, mathematical, in character, being currently carried out 
mainly by mathematical economists. These differences in emphasis could be seen as an 
opportunity to complement both approaches in the future. If one thinks that probably the 
main criticism (or one of the main) to Veblen’s approach, and to the old school of 
institutional economics in general, is its lack of formal theory and of an operational 
“toolkit” that allows the replication of institutional analysis by the academic economics 
community at large, it becomes evident that the more formal nature of EGT could provide 
the necessary theoretical concepts to formalise some of the institutional theory proposed by 
Veblen and his followers and to apply the institutional analysis to specific economic 
problems. In the same way, in terms of EGT, it can be argued that a clear connection 
between the literature on evolutionary economics and the economic rationale of EGT’s 
concepts has not been thus far developed (Weibull, 1995, 1998). In this context Veblen’s 
contributions could be valuable by providing the basis for a justification of the application 
of EGT elements in economics, and insights into the development of a Darwinian, 
evolutionary, economics based on EGT. Thus, it can be argued that this relationship can 
supply an interesting new avenue for future research aimed at complementing both research 
projects.  
4.2.2 Institutional Context 
 
While in the traditional approach to economics typically so called 'economic factors' are 
considered in the analysis, Veblen argued that all institutions "may be said to be in some 
measure economic institutions". The approach he proposes is thus more inclusive, 
considering the cultural and institutional context as key to economic analysis. This point is 
also related to the importance of history in economics discussed above, which Veblen 
repeatedly emphasised in his works on evolutionary economics (see section 2 and figure 1). 
This stress on the importance of the context in economic analysis contrasts sharply with the 
currently dominant paradigm in economics, where models are typically thought to be 
applicable to different situations, unchanged, regardless of the institutional, cultural, and 
historical context. This is specially thus in the traditional approach to game theory where 
                                                
10 As Mailath (1998: 1348) explains: “Since evolutionary game theory studies populations playing games, it is 
also useful for studying social norms and conventions. Indeed, many of the motivating ideas are the same”. Se 
also Weibull (1996: 34). 
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the same game is applied to similar strategic environments without considering the 
distinctive characteristics and setting of the players involved. 
 
Nevertheless, on this point it can be argued that EGT when applied to the socio-economic 
context is also consistent with Veblen’s approach. In fact, from many economic 
applications it becomes evident that some of the results of EGT depend on the details of the 
selection and mutations processes involved (Weibull, 1998: 20). Consequently, in terms of 
EGT this dependency on context implies that predictions in some games depend on the 
context in which the game is played. This point has been made several times by the 
distinguished game theorist Ken Binmore (see, for instance, Binmore (1996: x-xi)). 
 
While the dependency on context of EGT’s results can be seen as a natural coincidence 
with Veblen’s work and therefore with a truly evolutionary approach to economics, this 
characteristic of EGT is not without its critics. In fact, for some practitioners, who consider 
that a model, or a game in this case, should be a complete description of the problem or 
situation being analysed, context dependency represents a major shortcoming of EGT. It is 
in this context that Veblen’s perspective can be useful to enrich the debate on this issue in 
evolutionary game theory and economics in general, by providing the rationale behind the 
need for incorporating an historical and institutional analysis in an evolutionary approach to 
economics. Thus far though in the economic literature on EGT, some game theorists have 
started to recognise that to incorporate the study of the context far from being a drawback 
represents a necessary step within the EGT approach to the socio-economic environment.  
4.2.3 Optimising Behaviour 
 
Another important parallel that can be established between Veblen’s work and EGT is the 
fact that both approaches allow for the study of non-optimising behaviour. Indeed, for 
Veblen a hedonistic conception was a clear impediment for developing an evolutionary 
economic science. In general an ‘hedonistic conception’ of man implies an analysis based 
on the profit maximisation hypothesis. This, in turn, involves theory mainly aimed at the 
characterisation of equilibrium, which according to Veblen is not compatible with an 
evolutionary view where the notion of equilibrium is meaningless. Besides, given Veblen’s 
conception of human nature, for him  the notion of maximisation as a motive of economic 
behaviour has only a very limited meaning (Eaton, 1984: 869). This view is compatible 
with the economic approach of EGT, which assumes boundedly rational players who have 
little or no information about the game. This is a key characteristic of EGT because it 
distinguishes it from the rationalistic approach to game theory which assumes one perfectly 
rational player for each position in the game. This feature of EGT has also implied that an 
important part of the economic research conducted on EGT has been on the evolution of 
rational behaviour, the basic question being: does evolution wipe out irrational behaviour? 
Typically, this type of analysis attempts to investigate whether or not sub-optimal 
behaviours will be selected against in the long run by a trial-and-error process, the more 
specific issue being whether or not market forces will select against firms and firm 
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practices that perform poorly (see, for instance, the reviews of EGT by Van Damme (1994) 
and Weibull (1998)). 
 
This topic on the evolution of rationality can also be connected with the evolution of social 
norms. In particular, some studies have contrasted norm-guided behaviour, which is 
associated with not-optimising, non-rational, behaviour, with optimising, rational, 
behaviour. This is, for example, the case of Banerjee and Weibull's (1994) work which in 
their words: "attempt[s] to look at the old question of survival of nonrational agents in a 
strategic environment represented as a symmetric two-player game" (Banerjee and Weibull, 
1994: 343). In their model they consider that non-rational agents act exactly like the agents 
in standard evolutionary game theory, i.e. they always play a fixed pure strategy, 
irrespective of any information they might have about their opponent or the current 
distribution of strategies in the population (from which the opponent is randomly drawn). 
Banerjee and Weibull call these agents "programmed" and characterised them as follows: 
"[P]rogrammed agents do not always play 'irrationally' in the sense of using (strongly or 
weakly) dominated strategies; they may indeed (at least occasionally) play a best reply to 
the strategy used by their opponent. In a sufficiently varied environment, though, they will 
end up playing nonoptimally against many of their opponents" (Banerjee and Weibull, 
1994: 343-344). On the other hand, they define "rational" agents as those that always play 
optimally given their information and call them optimising. Specifically, they use the 
concept of the replicator dynamics to analyse the evolution of rational and non-rational 
behaviour, studying how the population shares of not optimising and optimising groups in 
this generalised evolutionary game theory setting develop over time, examining the 
attractors of this dynamic process. In this context, the principle of the replicator dynamics is 
based on the postulate that the relative shares of the various strategies present in a 
heterogeneous population will evolve under pressure of differential payoffs in such a 
manner as to cause strategies earning higher payoffs to proliferate relative to those earning 
lower payoffs. The basic result of Banerjee and Weibull's work is that under certain 
conditions a population of optimisers would not be stable against invasion by non-rational 
players who stubbornly adhere to a given strategy regardless of its material merits. In some 
cases extinction of optimisers occurs, in other cases co-existence with non-optimisers 
prevails.  
 
As Banerjee and Weibull rightly suggest: "nonoptimizing behavior here acts as a form of 
commitment" (1994: 344), it becomes evident that from this type of analysis non-rational 
behaviour can be associated with the adoption of specific social norms by part or the whole 
population. Hence, this result can be considered as crucial to provide an economic theory of 
the evolution of social norms based on evolutionary game theory. Obviously, this could not 
be possible working under the typical economic approach, i.e. non-co-operative game 
theory, which does not allow non-rational behaviour. This fact has also been recognised by 
Argyrous and Sethi (1996: 480-481) who in this context point out: "In certain contexts the 
'non-rational' behaviour can be interpreted as an adherence to social norms, so that the 
survival of such behaviour under pressure of differential payoffs can help to provide a 
theory of social norms. This line of thinking, which Axelrod (1986) has explored by means 
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of computer simulations, has been developed analytically in recent work by Binmore and 
Samuelson (1994) and Sethi (1996)".  
4.2.4 Institutional Conflict and Social Inefficient Outcomes 
 
From Veblen’s work it can be inferred that there can be some conflicts between institutions  
and that institutions are not always positive in terms of society’s welfare. While these ideas 
may seem to some extent intuitive, Veblen’s somehow descriptive type of approach does 
not provide the necessary elements to formalise these ideas in terms of formal theory. It is 
in this context that EGT can be useful to model some of Veblen’s institutional theory.  
 
A simple exercise using elements of EGT that shows the potential conflict between 
institutions, as suggested by Veblen, is provided by examples 1 and 2, where two 
competing institutions, one co-operative and one non-co-operative, are modelled. From 
these exercises, it transpires that any of the two conflicting conventions may emerge as the 
dominant one and that the evolutionary success of either of these institutions crucially 
depends on the initial number of people who subscribe to each of them (see also 
Hargreaves Heap and Varoufakis (1995: 208)). The rationale behind this result is simple. A 
social norm indicates the best course of action whenever you meet an individual who also 
adheres to your convention. Conversely, the same social norm will guide you to an inferior 
result whenever you meet an individual who subscribes to a different convention pointing 
to an alternative course of action. In this setting, it is clear that as the number of individuals 
using your convention increases so it becomes more likely that it will lead you to the best 
action. Moreover, since individuals change over conventions based on expected returns (see 
equation (5)), in the long run one institution will emerge as the dominant one. 
 
In terms of the potential social benefits of institutions, as Veblen pointed out, there are 
some situations where some institutions are clearly not efficient in terms of society’s 
welfare. This can also be shown using elements of EGT. Looking at example 1, it can be 
noted, for instance, that evolutionary stability does not reject the socially inefficient profile 
NC-NC, i.e. where both players use the non-co-operative fishing effort. In this sense a 
socially inefficient institution, e.g., always use strategy NC when meeting, may be 
evolutionarily stable. Similarly, as shown in example 2, the concept of the replicator 
dynamics also allows for socially inefficient institutions. In that case depending on the 
initial population adhering to the co-operative institution, the non-co-operative institution 
can become the dominant in the long run and people adopting the co-operative strategy will 
be wiped out. In this context, it can be argued that EGT is also consistent with the 
Veblenian idea that social institutions can produce socially inefficient outcomes and can 
therefore be used to pursue this type of institutional analysis studying conflicting 
institutions in society. 
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4.2.5 Evolution of Institutions 
 
Finally, in terms of the Darwinian character of Veblen’s approach, as pointed out above 
Veblen not only suggested that economic analysis should consider institutions as the main 
unit of study, but also that the development of the economic process can be investigated 
through the study of the evolution of the “prevalent habits of thought” present in society. In 
other words, according to Veblen the durable character of institutions makes possible to 
consider them as equivalent to the gene in the socio-economic world. Thus institutions 
evolve through time, changing as individuals and the environment embracing them 
changes, being selected according to their capacity to succeed in that environment. As 
Veblen succinctly put it: “The evolution of social structure has been a process of natural 
selection of institutions.” (Veblen, 1899: 188). This fits precisely with the approach of 
evolutionary game theoretic to the socio-economic context. What one typically studies 
using the concepts of evolutionary stability and/or replicator dynamics is what “strategy” 
within a population survives in the long run. Here the concept of strategy is associated with 
a particular type of behaviour, which is followed by a fraction or the whole population in a 
particular moment in time. In the particular case of the notion of evolutionary stability one 
assumes a monomorphic population in which all individuals follow a particular sort of 
behaviour, i.e. strategy,  and evaluates whether or not this type of behaviour can last in 
time, resisting thus the ‘invasion’ of alternative mutant strategies. In other words, one 
evaluates whether the incumbent strategy does better in terms of evolutionary success than 
the mutant strategy or not. Evidently, this type of analysis can be used to study the 
evolution of norms, conventions, or institutions as we called here, which in an economic 
context can be selected in terms of the material payoff they produce. This analysis can be 
further enriched by using the dynamic concept of replicator dynamics, which allows for the 
study of a genuinely diverse range of behaviour, by considering a polymorphic profile of 
strategies. 
 
5. Final Discussion 
 
As a result of reviewing EGT with each of the key features of Veblen's evolutionary 
framework., we conclude that EGT is indeed consistent with Veblen’s proposals, and thus 
may be considered to be a Veblenian evolutionary approach.  
 
However, EGT is not without its problems and limitations. Some researchers have put 
forward a number of criticisms of EGT which must be taken into account if this tool is to be 
successfully applied in economics. For example, applying EGT to social environments 
requires a clearer interpretation of "fitness". While “fitness” in economics is typically 
associated with monetary payoffs, it is sometimes not so clear that profit represents the best 
basis for an evolutionary analysis. For instance, differential growth rates or bankruptcy 
considerations may better represent "fitness" in the context of industrial competition (Vega-
Redondo, 1996: 2). Moreover, some authors claim that a more flexible framework is 
needed to formulate a true theory of social or cultural evolution; the usual linear (or strictly 
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increasing) function related to individual fitness has been criticised as being too restrictive. 
Similarly, since the utility theory used in conventional game theory assumes highly rational 
individuals, this approach to individual fitness should not be carried over to EGT which 
seeks to describe the behaviour of "boundedly rational" individuals (McKenzie, 2002). While 
all these concerns appear to be legitimate, some economists have already realised that, as in 
biology, the correct interpretation of “fitness” must be resolved empirically and therefore 
through a case-by-case type of analysis (Vega-Redondo, 1996: 2).  
 
Another point of criticism is related to the level of explanation provided by EGT. 
Reviewing the basic EGT concepts, the notion of ESS clearly does not explain how a 
population selects a strategy; its main concern is whether a strategy is robust to 
evolutionary pressures once it is reached (Weibull, 1996: 33). Similarly, the replicator 
dynamics tell us what strategy played by a proportion of the population will become the 
“social norm” (the one adopted by the majority), but does not tell us anything about how 
those strategies were adopted by players in the population in the first place. Accordingly, 
some authors argue that EGT models do not explain the etiology of a social phenomenon, but only 
the persistence of it. J. McKenzie (2002) claims that EGT may be irrelevant since: ”...we 
rarely need an evolutionary game theoretic model to identify a particular social 
phenomenon as stable or persistent as that can be done by observation of present conditions 
and examination of the historical records …”; This criticism is also applicable to game 
theory in general, since the Nash Equilibrium concept does not explain the arrival at such 
particular points, either. Nevertheless, while acknowledging the validity of McKenzie’s 
point, it can be argued that reality is never so simple that one can always easily observe the 
stability or persistence of complex social phenomena and hence conclude what the relevant 
variables involved are. In addition to clarifying some of these not so obvious points, game 
theoretic explanations can also be useful to formalise “the obvious and evident”, thus 
providing a stricter and clearer explanation of the stability of the particular situation being 
analysed. David M. Kreps makes a similar point, stating that game-theoretic analyses 
contribute: a unified language for comparing and contrasting common-sense intuitions; the 
ability to push intuitions into slightly more complex contexts; and  the means of checking 
on the logical consistency of specific insights with small changes in the assumptions 
(Kreps, 1997:88-89). 
 
Finally, EGT is also criticised for a lack of novelty. On this Gerald Silverberg (1997) 
claims that “…all of the approaches we have examined [including EGT] were purely 
selectionist: all possible entities at time zero are already present in the population, no new 
ones are added, and the only possibility is that some will be eliminated and the relative 
shares of others will change. True evolution, of course, also involves the creation of novelty 
in real time via random mechanisms. Instead of a strategy space of low dimension and full 
support, the modelling framework must be expanded to a more complicated space, high 
dimensional and/or effectively infinite, and only sparsely occupied.” To address this 
criticism, more complex models that are capable of generating new strategies are required. 
Acknowledging this limitation, some authors have already started to provide such models 
(see for instance, Lane (1993), Silverberg and Verspagen (1996), and Vega-Redondo 
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(1996)). However, these attempts are still very limited and this remains a topic for further 
research, not only in EGT but also in evolutionary economics in general. 
 
Despite its limitations, EGT still shows real promise from an institutional perspective. We 
offer three reasons for why institutional economists should be interested in this recently 
developed tool. Firstly, the methodological debate about the application of EGT to the 
social context is relatively recent and clearly incomplete. The independent development of 
EGT and evolutionary economics raises the question of what is the more appropriate 
methodological link between EGT and this field of economics. Institutional economists, 
who acknowledge the relevance of Veblen’s work on evolutionary economics, have the 
opportunity to contribute to the economic literature related to EGT which until now makes 
no mention of Veblen’s work at all (see, for instance, Weibull (1996; 1998), Vega-Redondo 
(1996), Samuelson (1997), Mailath (1998), Matsui (1996), and Van Damme (1987; 1994)). 
Secondly, the formal character of EGT provides an opportunity to incorporate into 
mainstream economic research, some topics frequently associated with the “old” school, by 
supplying a framework that allows the replication of results by the research community. In 
particular, EGT may provide the tools to formalise some of the main tenets and ideas of 
Veblen’s theory of socio-economic evolution. Finally, there are many research projects 
within the EGT literature which may appeal to institutional economists. For instance, here 
we could mention: (a) the work on the “evolution of preferences” based on the so-called 
"indirect evolutionary approach" proposed by Werner Güth (see, for instance, Bester and 
Güth’s (1998), Güth and Yaari (1992), Güth (1995) and Dufwenberg and Güth (1999)); (b) 
the study of the “evolution of social norms” in specific economic settings – an excellent 
example here is provided by the work of Rajiv Sethi and E. Somanathan (1996) which 
examines the problem of the exploitation of a common property resource within an 
evolutionary game theoretic framework– and (c) the “economic anthropology” of Herbert 
Gintis and Samuel Bowles, which is based mainly on EGT tools, which by itself provides 
an extensive research agenda for institutional economists. Among the specific topics they 
have addressed we can mention: the importance and origins of reciprocity, fairness and co-
operation in primitive societies and the measure of social norms and preferences using 
experimental games (see, inter alia, Gintis, (2001), Henrich et al.(2001), and Bowles and 
Gintis (1998)). 
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